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Abstract
The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants
of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings
program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring
technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. Two million buildings
were registered as a result of the program. Our difference-in-differences identification
strategy exploits both variation across towns in the ex-ante program scope to increase
enforcement as well as administrative data on actual building registrations. Local
incumbents experience an increase in their reelection likelihood as a consequence of the
policy. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion
tolerance and with higher speed of public good provision, implying complementarity
among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and government efficiency.
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1 Introduction
A government’s ability to enforce tax collection efficiently is one of the fundamental com-
ponents of state capacity and, in turn, has historically been an important driver of economic
development. Tax evasion generates significant losses and distortions in government rev-
enues.1 The literature (e.g., Slemrod (2007); Besley and Persson (2013)) describes three
main determinants of tax compliance: enforcement technology, political incentives, and cul-
tural norms. This paper illustrates the interaction among these three factors. We estimate
the electoral returns – the change in reelection likelihood – that local policymakers obtain
from a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy based on an innovation in tax-compliance
monitoring technology. In addition, we study how these electoral returns depend on underly-
ing social preferences for tax compliance and on local government efficiency in the provision
of public goods. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical evidence
concerning voters’ responses to anti-tax evasion policies.
Measures to reduce tax evasion generate a conflict between voters. The measures hurt
tax evaders, typically a minority of voters, while the majority of the population is likely to
benefit from additional government expenditures, lower tax rates, or even directly from the
punishment of former shirkers. For instance, a recent survey administered by Bank of Italy
finds that approximately 76 percent of the respondents believed that fighting tax evasion
should be among the foremost priorities for Italian public policy (Cannari and D’Alessio,
2006). However, the magnitude of the individual costs tax evaders incur from enforcement
is potentially higher than the individual benefit non-evaders derive from it. Anti-tax evasion
policies are thus canonical examples of policies that are asymmetric in their concentration
of costs and benefits (Tullock (1959); Olson (1965)). Due to this asymmetry, fighting tax
evasion may either benefit or harm politicians who seek reelection. The sign of this impact
is ex ante ambiguous and, therefore, an empirical question.
In 2007, the Italian government instituted a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy, the Ghost
1Slemrod (2007) states that, according to existing evidence: “the overall net noncompliance rate for all
U.S. federal taxes and the individual income tax seems to stand at about 14 percent”. Estimates from other
developed countries deliver similar figures (for Italy, see Marino and Zizza (2008)). In developing countries,
where the share of the informal economy is typically larger, the figures are much higher (Gordon and Li
(2009)). La Porta and Shleifer (2008) focus on the relationship between economic development and the size
of the informal economy.
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Buildings program. The program identified ghost buildings – properties not included in the
land registry and thus hidden from tax authorities – by overlaying aerial photographs and
digital land registry maps. The intervention detected more than two million parcels (the
unit of the land registry) with ghost buildings. A large registration program targeting the
identified ghost buildings followed the completion of the mapping exercise. While the central
government began the program and coordinated registration activities, municipal adminis-
trations circulated information about the program, collaborated with follow-up inspections,
and enforced payment of overdue local taxes. Media reports highlight both the importance
of local administrations in the registration process and that local governments took credit for
the enforcement that followed the mapping exercise (Dell’Oste and Trovati (2011), Bernardini
(2011) and Barca (2008)).
The policy induced a large shift in tax enforcement, the intensity of which varied sig-
nificantly across towns. In towns with a higher prevalence of detected ghost buildings, the
program was more likely to affect the amount of building registration. We use a measure of
Ghost Building Intensity, the ratio of the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings
identified by the program to the total number of land registry parcels in the town, to proxy
for the scope of the program. Ceteris paribus, there is a higher opportunity to reduce tax
evasion in towns with a larger fraction of ghost buildings detected by the program.
The data show that the increase in enforcement is stronger in towns with higher ghost
building intensity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we test the impact of the anti-
evasion policy on the reelection of local incumbents by exploiting the cross-municipality vari-
ation in this intensity. Our strategy controls for time-invariant town characteristics through
the use of town fixed effects. It identifies the causal effect of the policy scope to increase
enforcement on electoral outcomes under standard assumptions (i.e., no contemporary differ-
ential changes and no differential pre-trends in the outcome variable by treatment intensity)
that we verify in the data. In particular, it isolates the effect of an exogenous change in
enforcement from other mayor or voter characteristics that might have affected the actual
levels of ghost building registration in the town.
The results show sizable political responses. In local elections occurring after the begin-
ning of the program, an increase of one standard deviation in the ghost building intensity
raises the likelihood of reelection of the local incumbent relative to pre-program elections
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by approximately 2.2 percentage points, approximately 4.8 percent of the average reelection
rate (45.3 percent). Higher town-level ghost building intensity also lowers several measures of
competitiveness in local elections. In particular, it reduces the number of candidates running
for election, increases the margin of victory for the winner, and reduces the likelihood of a
runoff.
Guiding our empirical models is a retrospective voting framework of political agency
(Barro (1973); Ferejohn (1986)), which we adapt to study tax evasion. This theoretical
framework helps us to predict how a change in tax enforcement can impact voter choices and
which factors affect this response. Additional analysis of the actual building registrations
induced by the program complements the reduced-form analysis described above. For a given
town-level program scope, a higher registration rate of ghost buildings under the incumbent
local administration (i.e., the share of ghost buildings that are registered prior to the local
election date) has a positive effect on the likelihood of reelection. The result is robust to
the inclusion of mayors’ characteristics as controls and to an instrumental variable approach,
based on the time elapsed between the program start date and the town election date.
We provide evidence for two channels that could drive the observed electoral response.
First, using survey data on the self-reported tolerance for tax evasion among voters, we show
that the program’s positive impact on incumbent reelection is significantly higher in areas
with lower tolerance for tax evasion. Second, towns where the government is more efficient
in delivering public goods show a larger electoral response to the program. We also verify
that towns with higher ghost building intensity experienced a differential increase in local
government expenditures following the program’s inception. Finally, the empirical findings
are inconsistent with two potential alternative interpretations of the impact of the program on
voter support for incumbents. In the first, the program changes voter behavior by providing
information on the existing stock of ghost buildings. In the second, it gives the incumbent
an electoral rent by giving her the option to not register identified ghost buildings.
Our approach has the potential to be applied in different settings to study the political
feasibility of upgrading tax administrations around the world using new electronic data,
cross-checking technologies, and other monitoring devices.2 Additionally, our analysis points
2For instance, other countries, such as Greece and Rwanda, have recently implemented policies using
similar technologies.
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at a complementarity between technological innovations in tax enforcement and political
incentives. When exposed to a reduction in monitoring costs, politicians can exploit the
new technologies and experience political gains. These findings have a direct bearing on the
political feasibility of upgrading tax administrations around the world using new electronic
data, cross-checking technologies, and other monitoring devices (Bird and Zolt (2008)). In
addition, our study provides evidence that the underlying tax culture shapes the political
incentives for tax enforcement and the political returns to these innovations (Torgler (2007);
Rothstein (2000)).
Finally, access to the program’s town-level nationwide administrative data allows us to
provide evidence on two additional fronts. First, we study the correlates of tax evasion at the
town level. We find that geographical features such as town size are important determinants
of tax evasion, consistent with Saiz (2010), and that social capital is negatively correlated
with tax evasion (Putnam (2001)). Second, we document that mayors’ characteristics, such
as education, gender, and age, do affect the extent to which the Ghost Buildings program
increased tax enforcement (consistent with Alesina (1988); Besley and Coate (1997); Besley,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2012)).
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, a recent set of studies uses mi-
crodata to shed light on enforcement technologies such as third-party reporting (Slemrod,
Blumenthal, and Christian (2001), Saez (2010), Kleven et al. (2011), Chetty, Friedman, and
Saez (2012)), paper trails (Pomeranz (2012); Kumler, Verhoogen, and Fr´ıas (2011)), cross-
checking (Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2012)), targeted auditing strategies (Almunia and
Lopez-Rodriguez (2012); Aparicio (2012)) and third-party monitoring of customs duty collec-
tion (Yang (2008a, 2008b)).3 Second, this paper is related to the political agency literature
(Barro (1973); Ferejohn (1986)). Retrospective voting models have received considerable em-
pirical support, in the context of fiscal stabilization, for example, which is the setting of this
study (Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen (2008); Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2011)). By
studying how technology-driven enforcement policies affect policymakers, we build a bridge
between the political agency and the tax evasion literature. In addition, by delving into the
relationship between the incentives of political agents and tax evasion, our paper is related
3For a review of the literature, see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002).
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to the work of Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2012), who find that tax evasion is higher
in industries supported by parliamentarians. Finally, our results provide support to existing
literature that highlights the roles of culture and social norms as determinants of tax evasion,
either via cross-country analysis (Torgler (2003); Slemrod (2003)) or lab experiments (Spicer
and Becker (1980); Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Ghost Build-
ings program. Section 3 presents a simple framework that guides our empirical analysis.
Section 4 describes the data and presents descriptive evidence. Section 5 lays out our empir-
ical strategy to estimate the electoral response to the policy. Section 6 presents the results.
Section 7 presents the study’s conclusions.
2 The Ghost Buildings Program
The value of the buildings registered in the land registry enter the tax base for several
national and local taxes, including ICI (the local property tax), IRPEF (the personal income
tax, which is both national and local), and the local waste management tax. Italian legislation
requires that owners register new buildings at the local office of the Agenzia del Territorio,
the agency managing the land registry, within thirty days after their completion.4
In 2006, the national government approved new anti-tax evasion legislation, the Ghost
Buildings program, aimed at detecting buildings not registered on the land registry maps.5.
Italy’s national politics were unstable during the years in which the program was imple-
mented: Silvio Berlusconi (right-wing) was the Prime Minister in the first half of 2006,
Romano Prodi (left-wing) was the Prime Minister from the second half of 2006 to 2008,
and Silvio Berlusconi was again Prime Minister between 2008 and 2011. Therefore, the
attribution of the policy to one specific national party is not obvious.
The Agenzia del Territorio, the national agency managing the land registry, coordinated
4See Legge 9 Marzo 2006 n.80 - Art. 34-quinquies. All buildings in Italy require a building permit before
construction can begin, and obtaining a building permit makes the new building part of the City Plan. The
process of obtaining building permits is administered independently from the registration in the land registry
maps. Buildings not in the City Plan are required to be demolished.
5See Legge 24 novembre 2006, n. 286 subsequently modified by Legge 30 Luglio 2010, n. 122 The
detection exercise did not cover one of the semi-autonomous regions, Trentino Alto-Adige because land
registry maps are autonomously administered in that region. The region contains less than two percent of
the total population of Italy.
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the effort. The agency first juxtaposed the land and building registry maps to obtain the
Official Building Map. It subsequently compiled high-resolution (50 cm) aerial photographs of
the entire country to identify the ghost buildings. Appendix Figures A.1A-A.1C summarize
the identification steps. First, the aerial photograph of a particular location was created.
Then, the pictures were matched with the official building map for the corresponding area.
Finally, the ghost buildings were identified.6 Ghost buildings include commercial, industrial,
and residential stand-alone buildings, as well as substantial extensions of previously registered
buildings that should have been reported to the land registry.
Through this process, the Agenzia del Territorio identified approximately two million land
registry parcels containing unregistered buildings. Beginning in August 2007, the Agenzia
del Territorio started publishing parcel-level data on unregistered properties in the Gazzetta
Ufficiale, the official bulletin promulgating Italian laws and decrees, to induce registrations
of the ghost buildings. Within three years, it coded detailed information on the number of
ghost buildings in the universe of Italian municipalities (with the exception of Trentino Alto-
Adige). The order of publication relied on the availability of digitized land registry maps at
the time when the program started. The Agenzia del Territorio had 60 percent of the land
registry maps of the Italian territory in digitized form before the Ghost Buildings program
was approved. After 2006, the Agenzia del Territorio began digitizing the remaining land
registry maps, proceeding by province (i.e., they simultaneously coded different municipalities
in the same province). It completed the identification exercise by the end of 2010.7
According to the initial legislation, owners could register the detected ghost building with
the land registry by April 30, 2011.8 Widespread media campaigns and local administrations’
efforts contributed to achieve high registration rates. In particular, local administrators
a) disseminated information about targeted parcels; b) collaborated on follow-up building
inspections; c) proceeded with the collection of overdue local taxes up to five years before
the program began; and d) verified the conformity of ghost buildings to the city plan and
6According to the Law Decreto Ministero delle Finanze 2 gennaio 1998, n.28.Art. 3, the following build-
ings do not increase the tax base of their owners and thus are not subject to registration requirements:
(i) buildings that are incomplete; (ii) buildings that are particularly degraded; (iii) solar collectors; (iv)
greenhouses; and (v) henhouses or other buildings reserved for animals.
7Publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale occurred in the following waves: August 2007, October 2007, De-
cember 2007, December 2008, December 2009, December 2010.
8This was the result of two previous deadlines of ninety days and seven months since the publication in
the Gazzetta Ufficiale.
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local zoning restrictions. In addition, there is extensive evidence from the media that local
governments often attempted to take full credit for the registration process. In Section 3, we
highlight this is an important element for understanding the voter responses we document in
this paper.
Owners of ghost buildings who registered prior to the April 2011 deadline were required
to pay overdue taxes dating back to 2007, or to the construction date for post-2007 cases,
and to pay penalties for delayed payments. After April 2011, the Agenzia del Territorio, with
the support of local administrations and contractors, proceeded with follow-up inspections
to impute the tax base for the remaining unregistered buildings.9 Additional penalties and
a fee for the extra inspection were assessed to the owners of buildings for which the Agenzia
del Territorio imputed the tax base after April 2011. The Agenzia del Territorio published
a report on the detailed fiscal impact of the program for the year 2011. The program led
to a substantial wave of registrations. According to the administrative data, approximately
40 percent of the ghost buildings were registered as of December 30th, 2011. According to
the figures provided, the program increased total tax revenues by 472 million euros in that
year.10 Local administrations received a large share of the additional tax revenues generated
by the program, and we estimate that approximately 65 percent of those revenues come from
local taxes. We run a back-of-the-envelope calculation using figures on the number of land
parcels with ghost buildings, the registration rates, and the total additional tax revenues
from the program. A one standard deviation increase in ghost buildings targeted by the
program increased the tax revenues by approximately 3 percent of the median value. Using
the same information, we find that, on average, the owner of a registered ghost building now
faces an additional yearly tax burden of approximately 528 Euros.
3 Tax Enforcement and Retrospective Voting: A Con-
ceptual Framework
This section outlines the impact of a change in tax enforcement on voters’ electoral choices.
We provide a simple framework based on the modeling of retrospective voting (Barro (1973);
9To further increase incentives for the local administrations, an additional bonus was introduced in 2011
for each registered ghost building. See also Decreto Legge 79/2010, art. 10, 11.
10This figure does not include payment for overdue taxes from previous years.
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Ferejohn (1986)) and tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo (1972)). The main intuition of
retrospective voting models is that citizens decide whether to reelect the incumbent based on
their welfare in the most recent political term.11 While the discussion in this section relies
heavily on intuition from existing models of political agency, their specific application to tax
evasion is novel and provides new comparative statics.
The economy is populated by a unit mass of voters and by politicians. Voters are het-
erogeneous in their ability to evade. This ability could be a function of occupation type
(employed vs. self-dependent) or evasion costs (economic and psychological). We consider
a simple case with two fixed types of voters: evaders and non-evaders. Evaders pay taxes
only if enforcement occurs, while non-evaders always pay taxes.12 The population share of
evaders is λ. The enforcement of tax collection for each evader occurs with probability p.
Enforcement draws are independent across evaders, and thus p is the share of evaders for
which enforcement occurs. This is assumed to be a function of the politician type (a) and of
an idiosyncratic component (υ), whose distributions are G(a) and G(υ), respectively. Voters
do not observe the two components and are uncertain over the politician type as in Banks
and Sundaram (1998). They use previous realizations to form expectations aˆ and pˆ, in the
spirit of Holmstrom (1982).
We assume an exogenous income level, normalized to 1, and tax rate, τ , constant across
the population. Voters derive utility from disposable income and from the overall level
of enforcement, for instance, through the increased provision of public goods and deficit
reduction. This implies that enforcement has two effects on evaders’ utility, which go in
opposite directions. First, enforcement decreases the disposable income for evaders; however,
cracking down on tax evasion increases the size of the government, which benefits all citizens,
including evaders.13 The expected utility for evaders, VE is defined as:
VE(pˆ) = pˆ(U(1− τ)) + (1− pˆ)U(1) + pˆWE(λ, e), (1)
11For empirical applications based on the retrospective voting model framework see: Brender (2003); Besley
and Pratt (2006); Brender and Drazen (2008); Ferraz and Finan (2008); Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2011);
Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano (2012).
12For simplicity, we ignore the extra fines evaders pay when audited and, thus, the optimal individual
evasion level they choose.
13While we do not model this explicitly, it is possible that non-evaders can incur costs from higher tax
enforcement. For instance, previously evading firms may now charge higher prices to non-evading consumers
because of their increased costs.
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where we highlight that VE depends on the expected level of enforcement, pˆ. In Equation
1, U(·) is the monetary utility from disposable income and WE(·) is the utility from tax
collection enforcement.14 WE is increasing in λ, the share of evaders in the population, and
e, government efficiency in using tax revenues to produce public goods.
We allow non-evaders to obtain an additional non-monetary benefit from enforcement.
One example is the case where, because of fairness concerns, non-evaders derive direct utility
from the enforcement of evaders’ tax payments, independently from their monetary returns.15
Thus, the expected utility function for the non-evaders is:
VN(pˆ) = pˆWN(λ, e, b) + U(1− τ) (2)
We notice that, in addition to λ and e, VN also depends on b, a shifter that affects the
non-monetary benefits from increases in enforcement. For instance, b captures the extent
to which voters are averse to tax evasion (tax culture). In the model, we abstract from the
utility arising from government services financed by the tax payments of the non-evaders
because that does not depend on pˆ, the core variable of interest for our argument.
We now consider the voters’ choice between an incumbent and a contender. We adopt
a standard probabilistic voting approach (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In the text below,
aˆ and pˆ denote the voters’ beliefs about incumbent type and enforcement, respectively. On
the other hand, a and p capture the expectations about the contender. In deciding whether
to reelect the incumbent, the two groups of voters compare the utility under the expected
incumbent’s type with an average opponent. Voter i in group j = {E,N} will reelect the
incumbent if Vj(pˆ) > Vj(p) + ij + δ. The parameter ij is an individual ideological bias with
respect to the contender, distributed uniformly over [− 1
2φj
, 1
2φj
].16 The parameter δ measures
the average popularity of the contender in the population and is distributed uniformly over
U [−1
2
, 1
2
]. Under the above assumptions, the ex-ante incumbent reelection probability (i.e.,
14To simplify the presentation, we assume that the utility from enforcement is proportional to the expected
level of enforcement.
15For experimental evidence on this channel, see Carpenter et al. (2009); Casari and Luini (2009); Ouss
and Peysakhovich (2012).
16The parameters φE and φN should be interpreted as proxies for the responsiveness of voters in each
group to tax evasion enforcement. For example, they might reflect the fact that a group’s political power can
change depending on its size or ability to self-organize (Olson(1965)).
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before the realization of δ) is:
pi = (pˆ− p) [λφE(−U(1) + U(1− τ) +WE) + (1− λ)φNWN ] (3)
The following equation presents the electoral impact of an increase in the expected enforce-
ment level under the incumbent, pˆ:
∂pi
∂pˆ
= λφE
(− U(1) + U(1− τ) +WE) + (1− λ)φNWN (4)
The first term represents the net electoral gains coming from evaders voting. These will be
negative whenever the utility cost of the expected loss in disposable income, U(1)−U(1−τ),
more than offsets the benefits from enforcement, WE. The second term is the electoral gain
from non-evaders (always positive). This duality is consistent with the discussion in Section
1: an increase in the perception of the enforcement type of the incumbent has ambiguous
effects. The change generates a conflict across voters and the model parameters determine
which channel prevails. In addition, the model delivers intuitive comparative statics on the
heterogeneity of the electoral impact arising from an increase in expected enforcement under
the incumbent. Both government efficiency in public good provision and the intensity of
non-monetary benefits from the additional enforcement matter play a role. Specifically:
∂2pi
∂pˆ∂e
= λφE
∂WE
∂e
+ (1− λ)φN ∂WN
∂e
(5)
and
∂2pi
∂pˆ∂b
= (1− λ)φN ∂WN
∂b
, (6)
which are both positive. To summarize, the simple model predicts that an exogenous increase
in the perceived level of enforcement under the incumbent:
i) has an ambiguous impact on the likelihood that the incumbent is reelected.
This impact:
ii) is larger when government is more efficient in the provision of public goods;
iii) is larger when there are greater non-monetary returns from enforcement.
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The Ghost Buildings program allows us to shed light on these predictions. The program,
initiated by the central government, can be considered as a positive shock to enforcement. We
argue that voters observe the increase in building registrations but have limited information
about the specific production function of enforcement (i.e., information collected by the
central government, the efforts of local administrations, and complementarity between the
two sources). This in turn increases the belief voters hold about the local incumbent type, aˆ
(and thus on pˆ), and, according to the model, generates an ambiguous effect on the incumbent
reelection probability.17
Crucially, this result relies on the assumption that voters have limited information about
the details of the Ghost Buildings program. They observe the change in enforcement and
still attribute a part of it to the incumbent, thus extracting a signal about her type. Models
with rational but poorly informed voters have received growing attention in the literature.
They can provide theoretical support for the empirical findings that voters’ electoral choices
respond to economic conditions (Wolfers (2009)), natural disasters (Cole, Healy, and Werker
(2012)), and quasi-random targeted transfers (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011)). In
addition, a recent wave of randomized experiments shows that information provision can
significantly affect voter choices and political outcomes (for a review, see Pande (2011)).
Poor voter information is particularly relevant for the Ghost Buildings program. It was
likely difficult for voters to make inferences about who exactly was ramping up enforcement.
Local administrations’ efforts complemented the initial identification process. In addition,
evidence from media reports and town bulletins suggest that mayors often took credit for the
enforcement following the program, and in some cases, even for the initial stages of building
identification through aerial pictures (Cavallaro (2011), Corriere della Citta` (2012), Gazzetta
del Mezzogiorno (2012)).
Finally, we notice that an alternative model where voters perfectly observe the nature of
the Ghost Buildings program (while they are still uncertain about the type of mayor) can also
predict an impact of the program on the voters’ support for the incumbent. In this alternative
setting, the program provides an opportunity for voters to extract a more precise signal about
the incumbent type, as in Bubb (2008). This can either benefit or hurt the incumbent in
17We thus assume that the voter belief about the mayor enforcement-type is increasing in the observed
level of enforcement. We do not, however, delve into the specifics of the process of changing voter beliefs.
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turn, depending, for instance, on voter risk preferences (Quattrone and Tversky (1988)) or on
the skewness of the distribution of incumbent types (Caselli et al. (2013)). In the empirical
analysis, we do not aim to differentiate the two classes of models. Rather, the insight that
the net voter response to an enforcement policy is theoretically ambiguous, which is common
to both models, motivates our empirical investigation.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
4.1 Data
The main database for the analysis includes information on the number of parcels con-
taining ghost buildings in each town. The aerial photographs detected more than two million
such parcels. We target the population of 7,720 of the 8,092 Italian towns for which we can
define the measure of ghost building intensity. Additionally, we obtain data on registered
ghost buildings up to the deadline of April 30, 2011. To analyze the electoral response to
ghost building registration, we construct a measure of registration imputable to the incum-
bent administration. Specifically, we multiply the registration rate by the ratio between
a) the time elapsed between program start date and election date and b) the time elapsed
between program start date and April 2011.18
We complement this information with data from the Italian Department of the Interior
(Ministero degli Interni) on the universe of municipal elections from 1993 to 2011.19 In
Figure 1, we plot the number of elections per year. Towns vote in different years according
to predetermined waves. We distinguish between elections before and after the beginning
of the Ghost Buildings program. There are almost 5,200 municipalities for which we have
data on an election that occurred after program inception (approximately 67 percent of the
total number of towns targeted by the program). Two institutional reforms that occurred in
the time span of our sample were relevant. First, in 1993, the starting year for our election
18In one of our robustness checks, we also compute a second measure of registration imputable to the
incumbent under the assumption of a constant growth rate of 50 percent in the registration levels over years.
19The Italian municipal government (Comune) is composed of a mayor (Sindaco), an executive committee
(Giunta) appointed by the mayor, and an elected city council (Consiglio Comunale) responsible for authorizing
the annual budget proposed by the mayor. The mayor and the executive committee, whose members’
appointments can be terminated by the mayor at will, propose changes in policies, such as reductions in the
tax rates or expenditures. Subsequently, the city council votes on the proposed modifications.
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sample, Italian municipal politics were overhauled: a new electoral law changed the mayoral
electoral system from party to individual ballot. It also introduced a two-term limit. Second,
in 2000, the length of the mayoral term was extended from four to five years.20
In addition to the core data, we collect geographic and socio-economic data at the mu-
nicipality level from the Italian National Statistical Office. Finally, we use two additional
data sources to test the channels driving the electoral response: town-level government ex-
penditures (from the Ministero degli Interni) and a region-level standardized score to the
question Do you justify tax cheating? from the European Values Study for each of the 20
Italian regions.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the paper. Panel A presents
the main variables related to the Ghost Buildings program. Panels B and C include town-
level geographical and socio-economic covariates, respectively. These are measured prior to
the inception of the Ghost Buildings program, mostly in the 2001 Population Census. Panel
D (Mayor variables) summarizes the characteristics of the mayor in office at the time of
the program’s inception in a particular town.21 In Panel E, we summarize the local election
panel variables. Tables A.1 and A.2 provide a detailed description of data sources and variable
definitions.
4.2 The Correlates of Tax Evasion
We use data from the Ghost Buildings program to study the correlates of tax evasion
at the town level. Figure 2 presents our measure of ghost building intensity across Italian
towns. Notably, ghost buildings are more prevalent in Southern Italy, and less widespread
20In limited cases, the term can last less than is provided by the law and elections can take place earlier.
Those limited cases include the resignation of the mayor, the resignation of the majority of the council or a
no-confidence vote in the council. Early termination is relatively infrequent in Italian local politics. In the
post-program period, only approximately 7 percent of the towns have an election in a year different than the
fifth one after the previous and for only 2.5 percent of the towns is the difference between the two larger than
one year. Consistent with the previous points, we verify that our results are not affected when we drop the
sample of towns with an election year in the post-program period that is different from the one scheduled by
the law.
21Only about half of mayors are matched to national parties, and the other parties are difficult to categorize
within a left-right spectrum. We therefore choose not to focus on this variable in our analysis. We note that
political party dummies among the controls in the regressions (for those mayors for which we have this
information) do not affect the results we present later in the paper.
13
in the North.22 Table 2 presents the correlates of ghost building intensity (per 1,000 land
registry parcels). In Column (1), we first study whether geographical factors (altitude, area
of the town, number of land registry parcels) are correlated with tax evasion. In Column
(2), we add socio-economic controls (population, income per capita, social capital, number
of firms, urbanization rate). Finally, in Column (3), we show that our results are unaffected
by the inclusion of regional fixed effects.23
We find that several geographic characteristics are strongly associated with tax evasion.
In particular, controlling for other variables, tax evasion is higher in geographically larger
municipalities. Plausibly, in cities with wide geographical extension, there are greater op-
portunities to hide unregistered buildings as the enforcement of building registration is more
difficult and resource-intensive. However, we cannot decisively interpret this evidence as
causal. Previous literature has shown, for example, that borders are endogenously deter-
mined (see, among others, Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004),
Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011)).
Finally, as expected, tax evasion is negatively associated with both social capital and
income. In particular, the finding on social capital is consistent with Putnam (2001), who
finds that the percentage of tax evasion, as measured by the Internal Revenue Service, is
strongly related to differences in social capital at the state level.
4.3 The Political Determinants of Ghost Building Registration
We now provide more details on the wave of registration of ghost buildings induced by
the program. First, we show that the number of ghost buildings detected by the program is a
good predictor of the number of ghost buildings that were registered in response to the policy.
Figure 3 displays the relationship between the number of land parcels with ghost buildings
eventually registered by the April 2011 deadline (registered ghost building intensity) and the
22The Agenzia del Territorio conducted its detection activities homogeneously throughout the country.
Thus, heterogeneity in the number of detected unregistered buildings captures differences in actual levels
of non-registration at the time of the aerial photographing, as opposed to differential intensity in detection
activity.
23For 3.5 percent of the towns in our sample we are missing at least one town-level control. In our regressions
throughout the paper, for each control we include a binary indicator which is equal to one if the control is
missing. In addition, we replace missing values with an arbitrary unique value. The results are unchanged
when we undo this and simply drop observations with missing values for the control variables.
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number of parcels that were identified as containing ghost buildings (ghost building intensity),
both as a share of the total number of land registry parcels. In the graph, the x-axis variable
is partitioned into percentiles. The scatter plot shows a clear increasing relationship. In a
linear regression analysis, an increase of one standard deviation in the detected intensity of
ghost buildings raises the registered ghost building intensity at April 2011 by approximately
0.75 standard deviations (p < 0.01). To summarize, the program scope at the town-level
strongly predicts the program’s actual impact on tax enforcement. This premise motivates
the strategy that we introduce in Section 5 to estimate the impact of the Ghost Buildings
program on electoral outcomes.
Second, we analyze the ghost building registration rate, defined as the percentage of
ghost building parcels that were registered by the April 2011 deadline. Figure 4 summarizes
the ghost building registration rate and documents a substantial dispersion across towns.
Table 3 documents the impact of the characteristics of the mayor at the time of the program
inception on this outcome. For a given level of the other covariates, the registration rate is
higher when mayors are male, younger, more educated, or were born in the same city in which
they serve as mayor. The correlation between gender and policies in Italian municipality is
potentially consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), who find that
female policymakers usually face greater difficulty in implementing policies while in office. To
the extent that education can be considered a proxy for politicians’ quality (see, for example,
Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011)), this set of results also supports the view that
better policymakers fight tax evasion more. We highlight the correlation between the mayor’s
birthplace and tax evasion enforcement. One possible explanation could be that mayors who
are born in the same city have access to additional information that can facilitate tax evasion
enforcement. We acknowledge that this evidence relies on cross-sectional correlation analysis
and thus should be interpreted with caution. However, we also notice that the results are
robust to the inclusion of geographical and socio-economic controls, in Columns (2) and (3),
respectively. With these caveats in mind, the findings of this section suggest that the mayors’
characteristics did have a role in shaping registration activities across towns.
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5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 The Electoral Response to the Ghost Buildings Program
In this section, we outline our approach to estimate the voter response to the Ghost Build-
ings program. We also aim to isolate the channels that drive this response. Our empirical
strategy exploits variation across towns in the program scope to increase tax enforcement.
We implement a difference-in-differences approach based on town-level ghost building inten-
sity, which we defined above as the ratio of the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings to the total number of land registry parcels in each town, measured at program
inception.
In Section 4.3, we documented that mayors’ characteristics, such as age, education, and
gender, predict the registration rate of the detected ghost buildings. However, the actual
levels of registration could depend on voter preferences and responsiveness to the program.
Thus, a naive analysis examining the relationship between actual ghost building registrations
and reelection outcomes will suffer from standard omitted variable bias. This motivates our
focus on ex ante program scope to measure the impact of enforcement.
The rationale for our identification approach is that program scope at the town level
predicts the exogenous increase in enforcement induced by the Ghost Buildings program, as
shown in Figure 3. Towns with a higher share of parcels containing detected ghost buildings
also have, on average, a higher share of parcels with registered ghost buildings, as measured
in April 2011. Importantly the intensity of ghost buildings is not a valid instrument for actual
registration intensity. The program can affect incumbent reelection probability through other
channels besides registration, for instance, by giving the mayors an opportunity to extract
rents from low program enforcement or by providing voters with information regarding past
enforcement. In section 6.3, we discuss these alternative interpretations and show that they
cannot drive our results; however, it could still be the case that these alternative mechanisms
partially affected the voter response, which would violate the standard exclusion restriction
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required for an instrumental variable approach.24 Our baseline specification is therefore:
Rimet = β0 + β1Postie ·Ghost Building Intensityi + ηm · Postie + φi + φt + imet (7)
The dependent variable Rimet is a dummy that indicates whether the incumbent of town i in
macro-area m is re-elected in election e in year t.25 Observations where the incumbent cannot
be reelected because of a binding term limit are excluded from the regression sample. The
dummy Post is equal to one when election e occurs after the beginning of the Ghost Buildings
program in the town. The coefficients ηm capture post-program period fixed effects that are
specific to the four Italian macro-areas m where town i is located.26 We also include town
fixed effects, φi, and election year fixed effects, φt. Town fixed effects would capture any time-
invariant difference across cities that may be correlated with ghost building intensity. Finally,
Ghost Building Intensityi is the intensity of ghost buildings in town i. The coefficient
of interest, β1, thus captures the differential impact of the Ghost Buildings program on
incumbent reelection by ghost building intensity. Throughout the paper, we cluster standard
errors at the provincial level to allow for spatial correlation in the error term. It should also
be noted that because of the existence of a two-term limit, our identification relies on mayors
in their first term. In a recent contribution, Mian and Sufi (2012) adopted a similar empirical
approach to study the effects of the fiscal stimulus in the US.
We adopt a similar regression model to study the impact of the program on other electoral
competitiveness outcomes. We focus on four variables: i) the number of candidates running
for mayor; ii) a binary indicator to capture re-candidacy (i.e., whether the incumbent runs
for election a second time); iii) the difference in the percentage of votes between the first and
the second candidate; and iv) a binary indicator equal to one if a runoff takes place, which
occurs in towns with more than 15,000 inhabitants when none of the candidates obtain an
absolute majority in the first-round.27
One potential challenge to our identification strategy may arise from the town-specific
24The coefficient of registration rate when instrumented by ghost building intensity is 6.21, significant at
the 1% level.
25The variable equals zero both if a mayor eligible for reelection does not run again or if she runs again
and is not elected.
26Macro-areas are North, Center, South, Islands.
27For the analysis of the difference in percentage votes between the first and second candidate, we always
use first-round results, even for elections when a runoff occurs.
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timing of publications of the unauthorized buildings lists. On the one hand, if local admin-
istrators had influence over publication dates, unpopular mayors in cities with high evasion
rates might lobby to delay publication. On the other hand, the central government might
push to start the program earlier in those towns where mayors set a lower level of tax enforce-
ment. In both these cases, our estimates of the impact of the Ghost Building program on
reelection likelihood may capture a selection effect. We address this concern in several ways.
First, as discussed in Section 2, we note that the timing of the publication was primarily
determined at the provincial level by the availability of digital land registry maps and was
highly clustered by province.28 Only approximately 7 percent of the post-program elections
have values for the post-program indicator different from the one they would have had based
on the modal date of publication in the province.
To address these discrepancies, we implement an instrumental variable approach. We
code elections based on whether they occur before or after the modal date of publication of
the unauthorized building lists in the province. We then instrument the actual Post dummy
with this binary indicator at the provincial level. The rationale for this choice is that the
provincial level modal inception year may be correlated with historic characteristics of towns
in the province (captured by our town fixed effects), but is unlikely to be driven by specific
mayor characteristics. On the other hand, these may be driving the discrepancies between
the town and the provincial program inception year.
We adopt this strategy for our main specifications.29 In addition, in Appendix Table A.3,
we present robustness checks using an alternative instrument for the post-program indica-
tor using the national modal program inception year. 30 As is standard in difference-in-
differences estimation, the identification of the coefficient of interest relies on two assump-
tions. The first is the absence of contemporary events that differentially affected towns with
a higher ghost building intensity. We are not aware of other policies targeting this form
of tax evasion that occurred concurrently with the Ghost Buildings program; however, it is
28Appendix Figure A.2 emphasizes the high level of provincial clustering in the publication years.
29The towns targeted by the program belonged to 101 provinces.
30We also note that our identification does not rely on comparison across towns with different publication
years. In addition, we perform two additional checks related to the timing of program inception. First, we
control for the interaction between the program inception year and the post program variable. Second, we
check that there is no evidence of differential pre-trends in prior reelection rates across towns with different
program inception years. Results are available on request.
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still possible that other events, which differ in intensity by other variables correlated with
ghost building intensity, occurred at the same time. We address this concern by presenting
alternative specifications where we include interactions between a comprehensive set of ge-
ographical, socio-economic, and political controls, all measured before the beginning of the
program, and the post-program binary indicator. The second assumption is the presence of
parallel trends in the outcome variable. We assess this assumption using several tests and
placebo exercises.
5.2 Tax Enforcement and Heterogeneity Analysis
The reduced form approach presented thus far tests whether a higher program scope
to increase tax enforcement at the town level affects incumbent reelection likelihood in the
post-program period. We complement this baseline regression with further analysis. First, we
show that it is the tax enforcement induced by the program that drives the electoral response,
as opposed to other potential interpretations. For this purpose, we use actual ghost building
registration data. In Section 4, we emphasized several important measurement limitations
of these data that warrant caution. With this caveat in mind, we test whether, for a given
intensity of ghost buildings, a higher ghost building registration rate (Registration Rate)
induced by the program has a positive effect on incumbent reelection likelihood:
Rimet = γ0 + γ1Postie ·Ghost Building Intensityi
+ γ2Postie ·Registration Ratei + ζm · Postie + µi + µt + υimet
(8)
As discussed above, an obvious threat to the identification of γ2 in Equation 8 arises from the
fact that the registration effort is potentially correlated with many town-level confounders.
We first check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of mayoral controls. In addition,
the timing of the program provides a strategy that can alleviate this concern. Even if the
program began in the same year in most of the towns, we can exploit the variation gener-
ated by the fact that Italian municipalities hold elections in different years. A longer time
period between the beginning of the program and the election date naturally leads to more
registration activities. This generates variation across towns in the registration rate achieved
prior to the local election date that is plausibly uncorrelated with mayor quality. We use this
instrumental variable strategy to examine the impact of a change in the registration rate on
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incumbent reelection likelihood.
Second, we shed light on the channels through which the program could affect voters’
political preferences. Consistent with the theoretical framework, we investigate the interac-
tion among the political returns to an increase in tax enforcement, tax culture – the stigma
associated with evading taxes – and local government efficiency in delivering public goods.
We use data from the European Value Study, the European component of the World Values
Survey, to study the role of tax culture. Specifically, we use the answers to the question: Do
you justify cheating on tax? Slemrod (2003) uses a similar variable to study the relationship
between tax culture and social capital. We are not aware of other variables that can plausibly
capture tax culture available at the sub-national level in Italy. In this dataset, geographical
identification of respondents is available only at the regional level (20 regions). We thus
compute and standardize region-level means. The following regression model tests whether
the electoral response to the Ghost Building program varies by tax evasion tolerance:
Rimet = δ0 + δ1Postie ·Ghost Building Intensityi + δ2Postie · Tax Evasion Tolerancei
+ δ3 · Postie ∗GBi · Tax Evasion Tolerancei + ξr · Postie + λi + λt + νimet,
(9)
where δ3 is the coefficient of interest.
We use the speed of public good provision as a proxy for the quality of the delivery at
the municipal level. This indicator is measured as the ratio of paid outlays in the municipal
financial report over the total outlays committed in the budget. The intuition is that the
provision of public goods is more effective in places where the actual allocation delivered to
citizens is closer to the amount allocated in the budget. This proxy has already been used to
measure the quality of public goods delivery (Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) and Grembi,
Nannicini and Troiano (2013)). We are not aware of other proxies that can plausibly capture
the efficiency of the universe of municipal governments in Italy. We compute the speed
of public good provision as the average across two pre-treatment years.31 The regression
model to capture heterogeneity by this variable is similar to the one presented in Equation
9. Finally, we also assess the impact of the program on town-level public expenditures. To
test whether the program scope to increase tax enforcement affected these expenditures, we
31The results, available on request, are similar with alternative definitions.
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adopt a specification similar to that which we presented in Equation 7, using the natural
logarithm of the local government expenditures as the dependent variable.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline Results
In this section, we investigate the electoral consequences of the Ghost Buildings program.
Figure 5 provides a visual analysis of the relationship between ghost building intensity and
changes in the incumbent reelection likelihood – our main outcome variable – after the
beginning of the program. On the x-axis, the ghost building intensity is partitioned into
percentiles. The scatterplot displays a clear increasing relationship.32
Table 4 formalizes the analysis above and presents the results of the difference-in-differences
estimation discussed in Section 5. Column (1) reports the basic OLS specification (“Reduced
Form”) using the provincial post-program indicator. The coefficient remains stable with the
addition of town fixed effects (Column (2)) and election year fixed effects (Column (3)). In-
cluding a rich set of town-level covariates interacted with the post-program dummy does not
change the results (Column (4)).33 Starting in Column (5), we instrument the post-program
indicator with the provincial post-program indicator. The coefficient is stable across the
different specifications. Again, the results are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects,
town fixed effects, and interaction among town controls and the post-program indicator, in
Columns (6)-(8), respectively.34 In Column (7), the baseline specification for the rest of the
analysis, the reported coefficient on the interaction between ghost building intensity and the
post-program indicator is 1.042, significant at 1 percent. This magnitude implies that a one
standard deviation increase in the town-level program scope to increase enforcement, as mea-
sured by the ghost building intensity, raises the likelihood of the incumbent’s reelection by
approximately 2.2 percentage points in post-program elections, relative to pre-program ones
(from a sample mean of 45.3 percent). A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the
32Appendix Figure A.3 presents a placebo version of Figure 5.
33Our results are similar when using natural logarithms instead of levels for some of the controls.
34Appendix Table A.3 presents several additional robustness checks. We show that the results are robust to
the inclusion of additional town controls (interacted with the post-program indicator), trimming procedures
and to alternative sample definitions, instrumentation strategies, and normalization measures.
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effect of a one standard deviation increase in Ghost Buildings program scope on incumbent
reelection probability is on the order of magnitude of 6 percent of the incumbency effect in
U.S. House elections (Lee (2008)).
In Figure 6, we check whether towns with different levels of evasion were on different
trends in the probability of incumbent reelection before the treatment. We report point
estimates and confidence intervals on ghost building intensity for each of the elections pre-
and post-program. The figures show that, before the Ghost Buildings program started, the
probability of reelection of the incumbent was independent of tax evasion. However, after the
beginning of the program there is a statistically and economically significant impact. Thus,
the coefficient pattern in Figure 6 suggests that the common trend assumption holds in our
setting. One potential concern is that because of the term limit rule, we only include towns
with first-term mayors; however, if the results were purely explained by composition, one
would expect large jumps in reelection rates even in pre-program elections. The lack of such
cyclical changes in our pre-trends graph attenuates the concerns arising from the fact that
the composition of towns change. Additionally, it is encouraging that our effect is robust
to the inclusion of a rich set of controls interacted with the post-program dummy: if the
sample composition was driving the observed effects, we would expect the inclusion of the
town covariates to substantially reduce the estimates.
We adopt an analogous regression strategy to study the impact of the program on other
measures of election competitiveness as described in Section 5. For each of these variables,
we report the specification used in Column (7) of Table 4. Table 5 presents a clear picture.
An increase in ghost building intensity raises the likelihood that the incumbent runs again,
and decreases the competitiveness of local elections. Specifically, a one standard deviation
increase in ghost building intensity reduces the number of candidates by 1.8 percent of the
sample mean, increases the likelihood that the incumbent runs again by 4.1 percent, increases
the margin of victory by 3.4 percent (although this last result is not statistically significant at
conventional levels), and reduces the likelihood of a runoff by 18 percent. This is consistent
with the idea that potential mayoral candidates correctly anticipate a stronger incumbent
advantage as a result of the program.35
35Appendix Figure A.4 shows that the parallel trend assumptions also hold for the other political outcome
variables described above.
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6.2 Tax Enforcement, Tax Culture and Efficiency of Local Gov-
ernments
This section elaborates on some of the potential channels through which the anti-tax
evasion program could increase voter support for the incumbent. Table 6 presents the re-
sults from the estimation of Equation 8. This step aims to show that the increase in tax
enforcement induced by the program – the ghost buildings registration – drove the electoral
response. In Column (1), we present the correlation between ghost building registration rates
and the likelihood of incumbent reelection. We find that, controlling for ghost building in-
tensity, a one standard deviation increase in ghost building registration rate raises reelection
likelihood by 1.3 percentage points. We use the registration rate reached by the election year
computed as described in Section 4. In Column (2), we show that adding the interaction
between town- and mayor-level controls and the post-program indicator does not change the
results. In Column (3), we show that in a cross-city regression, the number of years elapsed
from the program start date are a strong predictor of the city-level registration rate. This can
be interpreted as a first stage for our instrumental variable approach. In Column (4) we use
the years elapsed since the program start date as an instrument for registration rate.36 In the
IV specification, a one standard deviation increase in the registration rate (.079) raises the
reelection likelihood by 4 percentage points in post-program elections. Finally, in Column
(5) we show that the IV estimate is unchanged when adding the interaction between town
level controls and the post-program indicator.
In Columns (4) and (5), we notice that the IV estimates are larger than the respective OLS
estimates. This can be explained either by OLS attenuation bias due to measurement error,
or by the fact that in the set of cities affected by the IV – that is, cities where the registration
activity depends on program duration – the political returns to registration may be larger
than in the rest of the cities (i.e., we are estimating a LATE). Even if our instrument is
uncorrelated with any idiosyncratic city-specific characteristics, we are unable to rule out the
possibility that having the program for longer time has an independent effect on its impact on
the probability of reelection, which would invalidate the IV strategy. While we acknowledge
36In our IV specification we do not control for year fixed effects. Three quarters of the post-program
elections come from cities that started the program in 2007. Thus, we lose statistical significance when
running this specification, although it is reassuring that the coefficient of interest remains of a similar size.
Results are available upon request.
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this possibility, we still believe that our instrument performs well in addressing the main
endogeneity concern for the registration efforts of the mayors (town-specific characteristics,
such as the mayor’s ability or effort). We then provide empirical support for two channels
affecting the electoral response to the program. Our simple theoretical framework predicted
that this should be higher in towns where the non-monetary returns to tax enforcement are
higher and where the local government delivers public goods more effectively. We provide
evidence about these hypotheses by estimating Equation 9. The coefficient of interest δ3
captures the impact of a standard-deviation increase in the variables measuring either the
tolerance for tax evasion or the municipal speed of public goods provision on the electoral
response to the program. Table 7 presents the results. We then examine the role of tax
culture. We exploit variations across regions to the extent to which respondents justify tax
cheating in the European Values Study. These results provide clear evidence the tax culture
matters. In Column (1), we show that a one standard deviation increase in the tolerance score
reduces the point estimate of the impact of ghost buildings on reelection by .63, (significant
at the ten percent level). Column (2) shows that the magnitude of the coefficient is stable, or
if anything, increases (in absolute value) when adding the triple interactions with macro-area
dummies.37 These results provide suggestive evidence that the positive effect of the Ghost
Buildings program on incumbent reelection likelhood is larger in localities where voters have,
on average, stronger preferences for tax enforcement and where the delivery of public goods
is more effective.
We then focus on the role of local government efficiency. In Column (3) we find that
a one standard deviation increase in the speed of public good provision increases the point
estimate of the impact of ghost buildings on reelection by 0.63 and that this coefficient is
statistically significant at the ten percent level. We then confirm that this interaction effect
does not simply capture geographical variation in the responsiveness across different parts
of Italy by adding triple interactions across the post-program indicator, the ghost building
intensity, and the macro area dummies. The sign and economic significance of the coefficient
is robust (Column (4)), although estimated less precisely (p=.137). While the limited power
in these estimates should evoke some caution, the analysis presents evidence that voters’
37Standard errors are similar when performing region-level cluster bootstrapping following Cameron, Gel-
bach and Miller (2008).
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responses depend on underlying tax morale and government spending efficiency.
Finally, Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of the baseline regression model in
Equation 7, using the log of town-level government expenditures.38 Column (1) presents the
reduced-form results, using the post-program indicator based on the provincial mode. The
point estimate is .436 (significant at 10 percent). The coefficient is stable when instrumenting
the post-program indicator with the provincial one and is slightly larger when including
interactions among controls and the post-program indicator (Columns (2) and (3)).
While the effect of the program is statistically significant, we also note that it is fairly
small. A one standard-deviation increase in ghost-building intensity increases expenditures
by approximately 1 percent. We believe that it is unlikely that this effect explains the
entirety of the incumbent reelection effect we documented earlier in the paper. Consistent
with the suggestive evidence provided by the heterogeneity in tax culture, we suggest that
non-monetary factors (e.g., the direct utility non-evaders derive from catching the shirkers)
must play an important role.
6.3 Alternative Explanations
In this section, we argue that the increase in tax enforcement arising from the program
drives the results on voting support for the local incumbents and that this channel more than
offsets several alternative potential explanations about the impact of the Ghost Buildings
program.
First, the publication of the number of ghost buildings could generate information about
the incumbent. We believe this to be both unlikely and inconsistent with our findings.
First, the number of ghost buildings is a slow moving stock variable that is likely to have
accumulated over decades, rather than a reflection of only the most recent years. Most of
the buildings found by the Agenzia del Territorio were not newly constructed. The existence
of a term limit, paired with the fact that the time it takes to complete a building in Italy is
generally longer than in most other OECD countries, suggests that most of these buildings
could not have been built while the incumbent was in office. Second, we note that voters
who could potentially receive information from the publication are most likely the ones who
38As for the remainder of the paper, the regression model includes fixed effects, and we therefore obtain
identical results when using expenses per capita.
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were not evading before the program, as evaders were already aware of their own evasion.
Keeping this premise in mind, we believe our results rule out this alternative explanation.
In one version of this alternative story, voters, after learning about low levels of evasion de-
tected by the program, reward the current mayor for having properly enforced tax payment in
the past. This hypothesis predicts a negative impact of the detected ghost building intensity
on incumbent reelection in post-program elections, and as such it is obviously inconsistent
with our baseline results.
In another version of this alternative explanation, voters reward an incumbent mayor
for having allowed high levels of evasion in the past. First, this contradicts the intuition
that non-evaders, rather than those who previously evaded, are the ones who are potentially
acquiring new information. Second, this is unlikely because the purpose of the program, and
therefore the publication, was to shut down the evasion opportunity. Third, it is at odds with
the fact that the positive impact of program intensity on incumbent reelection is lower in
regions with higher tolerance for tax evasion. Fourth, it is also inconsistent with our results
showing that towns with higher registration levels are more likely, rather than less likely, to
reelect an incumbent mayor.
In a third potential alternative explanation, the program gives an incumbent an electoral
rent by allowing her to not register the targeted ghost buildings, for instance, by reporting
errors in the results generated by the mapping process.39 If this were the prevailing mecha-
nism, we would expect the positive impact of the program to be stronger in regions with a
higher tolerance for tax evasion, but we find the opposite to be the case. In addition, such an
explanation is inconsistent with the result that a higher share of registered ghost buildings at
the time of a local election increases reelection likelihood. The empirical results thus provide
strong evidence that it is the additional tax enforcement induced by the program, as opposed
to these alternative explanations, that drives the increase in the reelection prospects of the
incumbent.
39For example, the press agency of the mayor of a city in our sample, Capaccio Paestum, explicitly criticized
the excessive media attention to the program, indicating that the unregistered buildings in that city were
unregistered due to citizens’ needs (Comune di Capaccio Paestum, 2010).
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7 Conclusion
A rapidly growing literature shows that interventions that improve the technology of
tax enforcement – third-party reporting, cross-checking, or better auditing algorithms – can
substantially reduce tax evasion. Yet, political incentives to adopt these technologies are also
of crucial importance. Policymakers will delay or prevent enforcement policies if they are
bound to lose support because of them. In spite of this, little is known about the electoral
impact of fighting tax evasion. This paper provides evidence of a positive interaction between
technological improvements in tax-payer monitoring and political incentives. Specifically,
local incumbents are shown to obtain positive political returns, namely, an increase in their
reelection likelihood, from the Ghost Building program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy
in Italy that was based on a new enforcement technology.
The underlying tax culture, broadly defined as the individual propensity and social norms
determining evasion for a given level of technology, is another important determinant of tax
compliance. It shapes the enforcement level a government can achieve for a given enforcement
technology. We show that tax culture affects the political returns to undertaking anti-tax
evasion policies. The increase in incumbent reelection probabilities in response to the Ghost
Buildings program is larger in areas with a lower self-reported tolerance for tax evasion. Fi-
nally, we document that the political returns to enforcement policies are higher when the
government is more efficient in providing public goods. This paper’s findings have two im-
portant policy implications. First, they provide a framework for thinking about the political
feasibility of policies that increase the visibility of tax evasion, thus lowering monitoring
costs and increasing policymakers’ incentives to improve enforcement. This has immediate
relevance for special interest politics. Concentrated evader groups might effectively lobby to
keep evasion hidden from the public, but they are unlikely to be able to punish an incumbent
who enforces tax compliance after the evasion becomes broadly visible.
Second, there is potential complementarity among anti-tax evasion policies, government
responsiveness, and social preferences for tax compliance. Governments that plan to imple-
ment novel enforcement policies should concurrently attempt to strengthen their capabilities,
for instance, by improving the speed at which they respond to citizen’s needs, or by increas-
ing the social stigma associated with tax evasion. This complementarity will likely increase
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the returns politicians obtain from anti-tax evasion policies and will thus make such policies
better aligned with political agent incentives.
We are aware that using an identification strategy based on a specific natural experiment
enhances the internal validity of our study but may come at the price of lower external
validity, for instance, on shedding light on similar programs in other countries or on programs
targeting other taxes. Yet, we speculate that evidence of positive political returns to anti-tax
evasion policies in Italy, a country often cited as an example of poor tax culture, will be
a lower bound for other OECD countries. We believe an interesting goal for future work
would be to elucidate the potential non-linearity in the relationship between the prevalence
of tax evasion and political returns to enforcement policies. In addition, we believe that
complementarity between enforcement policies and social norms on evasion could potentially
be relevant for policy design in other regions of the world.
Another important dimension of external validity concerns enforcement policies targeting
other types of evasion. One of the merits of the Ghost Buildings program is that it detected
the entire stock of evasion. In contrast, the effectiveness of policies targeting other tax-
concealing activities might vary according to the ability of the specific evader to hide, which
might, in turn, affect how the public would respond. We hope future work will shed light on
the political returns to other enforcement policies around the world.
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Figures
Figure 1: Number of Elections per Year
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Notes: The figure shows, for each calendar year, the number of elections held before and after the inception
of the Ghost Buildings program.
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Figure 2: Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land registry parcels)
0 187
Notes: In this figure, Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings per thousand of land registry parcels. White areas identify towns with missing data.
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Figure 3: Registered Ghost Building Intensity
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Notes: The scatter plots the relation between Registered Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the fraction of land
parcels with ghost buildings that get registered by April 2011) and Ghost Building Intensity (i.e., the fraction
of land parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program). The x-axis is partitioned into percentiles.
The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the percentile. The y-axis is the
average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the percentile. We cut the top 1% of the x-axis
values from the graph. The line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
Figure 4: Ghost Building Registration Rate
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Notes: The histogram shows the distribution of the ghost building registration rate at April 30, 2011, defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings that get registered by this date
and the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program.
36
Figure 5: Difference in reelection rates pre- to post- Ghost Buildings program
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
Ch
an
ge
 in
 R
ee
le
ct
io
n 
Ra
te
s 
Pr
e 
to
 P
os
t P
ro
gr
am
0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
Ghost Building Intensity
Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate
between the pre-program and the post-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity. The x-axis is
partitioned into percentiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the
percentile. The y-axis is the average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the percentile. We cut
the top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph. The sample includes elections in which the incumbent does
not face a binding term-limit. The line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
Figure 6: Ghost Building Intensity Coefficient by Election Pre/Post Program
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each election before and after
the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. On the x-axis, elections are ranked based on their occurrence
relative to the program. The regression includes town and year fixed effects. The sample includes elections in
which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. For each election rank, we report the point estimate
and the 95% confidence interval. The election before the program (“-1”) is the omitted category, for which
confidence interval is obtained as the mean of the confidence interval width in election -2 and election +1.
The modal number of years between elections is five years between 1993 and 2001, and four afterwards.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Ghost Building Town Variables
Ghost Building Intensity 0.027 0.021 0 0.187 7720
Registered Ghost Building Intensity (Apr 2011) 0.006 0.006 0 0.051 7720
Ghost Building Registration Rate (Apr 2011) 0.243 0.181 0 1 7720
Panel B: Geographic Town Variables
Town Area Size (sq km) 37.044 50.096 0.2 1307.71 7720
Altitude (mt) 510.584 461.487 0 3072.5 7720
Land Registry Parcels (1,000) 10.776 13.278 0.001 514.372 7720
Panel C: Socio-Economic Town Variables
Population (1,000) 7.225 40.23 0.033 2546.804 7720
Disposable Income per capita (1,000 Euros) 13.449 3.042 5.013 44.949 7720
Urbanization Index 1.619 0.684 1 3 7720
Non-Profit Associations/1,000 pop 5.293 3.912 0.212 81.218 7720
Number of Firms per capita 0.076 0.027 0.018 0.344 7720
Panel D: Mayor Variables
Mayor Age 49.03 9.5 21 83 7720
Mayor Education 3.29 0.69 1 5 7720
Mayor Born Same City (0/1) 0.47 0.49 0 1 7720
Mayor Term Number 1.3 0.46 1 2 7720
Mayor Woman (0/1) 0.1 0.3 0 1 7720
Panel E: Election Panel Variables
Term Limit Indicator (0/1) 0.201 0.401 0 1 32422
Election Rank Relative to Publication -2.017 1.57 -8 1 25893
Post Program Election (0/1) 0.143 0.351 0 1 25893
Years Elapsed since Program Inception (= 0 if ≤ 0) 0.299 0.802 0 4 25893
Incumbent Reelection (0/1) 0.454 0.498 0 1 25893
N. Candidates 2.761 1.301 1 17 24585
Incumbent Rerun (0/1) 0.572 0.495 0 1 25525
Victory Margin 25.999 26.942 0 100 23933
Runoff (0/1) 0.525 0.499 0 1 2285
Notes: Socio-Economic Town Variables are collected before the Ghost Buildings program inception.
Mayor Variables refer to characteristics of the incumbent mayor at the time of program inception. Summary
statistics for the Election Panel Variables are reported for the subsample of elections with no binding
term limit, except for Term Limit Indicator. In all the tables, we replace missing values for the town-level
controls with regional means, so to retain a constant sample size. The range of missing values across variables
spans from 0 to 3.8%. The results are unchanged if, for each covariate, we add a dummy equal to one for
a missing value, instead. A detailed description and source of each variable is provided in Appendix Tables
A.1 and A.2.
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Table 2: The Determinants of Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land parcels)
(1) (2) (3)
Town Area Size (sq km) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.015) (0.012)
Altitude (mt) -0.015∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Land Registry Parcels (1,000) -0.236∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.070) (0.047)
Population (1,000) 0.020 0.004
(0.016) (0.011)
Disposable Income per capita (1,000 Euros) -2.598∗∗∗ -1.224∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.292)
Urbanization Index 5.940∗∗∗ 4.404∗∗∗
(1.837) (1.652)
Non-Profit Associations/1,000 pop -0.463∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.074)
Number of Firms per capita 56.244∗∗∗ 89.888∗∗∗
(20.100) (17.828)
Region FE X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building intensity per thousand of parcels, defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land
registry parcels, multiplied by one thousand. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 3: The Determinants of the Ghost Building Registration Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Mayor Age -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
Mayor Education 0.802∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.271) (0.239)
Mayor Born Same City (0/1) 1.054∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗
(0.424) (0.425) (0.411)
Mayor Term Number -0.201 -0.084 -0.082
(0.355) (0.341) (0.351)
Mayor Woman (0/1) -0.915 -1.223∗ -1.185∗
(0.637) (0.625) (0.608)
Geograpic Controls X X
Socio-Economic Controls X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building registration rate, defined as the ratio
between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings that get registered by April 2011 and the
number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified at the beginning of the program. Refer to Table
1 for a description of the Geographic and Socio-Economic Controls. All the regressions include regional fixed
effects and year-of-program-inception fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 4: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Baseline Results
Reduced Form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.097∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.373) (0.378) (0.366)
Ghost Building Intensity*Province Post 1.083∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.358) (0.360) (0.347)
Town FE X X X X X X
Election Year FE X X X X
Town Controls*Post X X
Observations 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected
(mean 0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. Province Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings
program modal inception year in the province. In the columns grouped under the header “2SLS”, Post is
instrumented with Post Province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number
of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. All the columns
include an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and either Province Post (Columns (1)-(4)) or Post
(Columns (5)-(8)). Columns (1) and (5) include the Ghost Building Intensity level. Extra Controls*Post
include town-level controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table 1 for a list of these variables.
The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent does not face
a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 5: Ghost Building Intensity and Election Competitiveness
N. Candidates Incumbent Rerun Victory Margin Runoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post Program -2.383∗∗ 1.115∗∗ 42.063 -4.502∗∗∗
(1.057) (0.457) (25.984) (1.383)
Dependent Variable Mean 2.761 0.572 25.999 0.525
Observations 24441 25483 23562 2216
Notes: N. Candidates is the number of candidates running for election. Incumbent Rerun is a binary
indicator equal to one when the current incumbent runs for reelection. Victory Margin is the percentage
point difference between the first and the second candidate in the elections (we use first-round percentages
even for towns with a runoff). Runoff is a binary indicator, defined only for towns with more than 15,000
inhabitants, equal to one if the election requires a runoff. This occurs if the first candidate in the first round
receives less than 50% of the votes. Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the
Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary
indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost
Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings
and the total number of land registry parcels. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year
fixed effects and an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. The regression sample includes
all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard
errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 6: Ghost Building Registration and Incumbent Reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 1st Stage 2SLS 2SLS
Ghost Building Registration Rate*Post 0.225∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.078) (0.196) (0.195)
Years Elapsed since Program Inception 0.076∗∗∗
(0.009)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.275∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 1.889∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.409) (0.391) (0.448)
Town Controls*Post X X
Observations 25893 25893 7720 25893 25893
Notes: Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) present election-panel regressions where the dependent variable is
a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected (mean 0.453). Post is a binary indicator
equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is
instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the modal program
inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number of
land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. Registration Rate
refers to the imputed registration rate at the time of the election using the April 2011 rate as a starting
point and assuming a constant yearly registration rate. Extra Controls*Post include town-level controls
interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table 1 for a list of these variables. The regressions include town
fixed effects, election-year fixed effects and an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. The
regression sample for these columns includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent
does not face a binding term-limit.
Column (3), First Stage, presents cross-town regressions where the dependent variable is the ghost
building registration rate at April 2011. The variable Years Elapsed since Program Inception measures
the years elapsed between the program inception year and 2011. The regression includes the levels of the
above controls, the level of the ghost building intensity and macro-areas fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 7: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection:
Heterogeneity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.063∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.229∗
(0.380) (0.668) (0.391) (0.682)
...*Justify Tax Cheating -0.639∗ -0.734∗
(0.364) (0.404)
...*Speed of Public Good Provision 0.627∗ 0.592
(0.380) (0.397)
GBI*Macro Area*Post No Yes No Yes
Observations 25893 25893 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected
(mean 0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the
election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is
defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number
of land registry parcels. GBI*Macro Area*Post is the triple interaction among macro-areas fixed effect,
ghost building intensity and Post All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects,
interactions between macro-areas fixed effects and Post, and an interaction between the relevant heterogeneity
variable for the column and Post. The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in
which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 8: Local Government Expenditures
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Ghost Buildings Intensity * Post 0.497∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.206)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post Province 0.441∗
(0.253)
Extra Controls*Post No No Yes
Observations 74664 74664 74664
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of municipal government expenditures. Post is
a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all
the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs
after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio
between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry
parcels. Extra Controls*Post include town level controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table
1 for a list of these variables. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects and an
interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *
p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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A Appendix (For Online Publication)
Appendix Figures
Figure A.1: The Ghost Building Identification Process
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Source: Agenzia del Territorio
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Figure A.2: Ghost Buildings Program Inception Year
Notes: The figure shows the year of inception of the Ghost Building program (i.e., the year of publication of
the list of ghost buildings) in each town. White areas identify towns with missing data.
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Figure A.3: Difference in reelection rates pre- to post- Placebo Ghost Buildings program
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Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate
between the pre-placebo-program and the post-placebo-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity
(i.e., the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of
land registry parcels). The placebo subsample of observations used for this graph only includes election that
occurred before the actual program inception. In each town, the year of the placebo program start is defined
as nine years before the actual publication. This roughly divides the graph sample in two equally sized groups
of pre-placebo and post-placebo elections. The x-axis is partitioned into percentiles. The x-axis of each dot
is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the percentile. The y-axis is the average value of the
registered ghost building intensity in the percentile. We cut the top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph.
The sample includes elections in which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. The line plots the
predicted values from a linear regression model.
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Figure A.4: Ghost Building Intensity Coefficient by Election Pre/Post Program
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Notes: Graphs 1 to 5 report the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each election before
and after the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. The modal number of years between elections is
five years between 1993 and 2001, and four afterwards. On the x-axis, elections are ranked based on their
occurrence relative to the program. The sample includes elections in which the incumbent does not face
a binding term-limit. Graph 6 reports the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each calendar
year before and after the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. The dependent variable is in natural
logarithm. On the x-axis, years are ranked based on their occurrence relative to the program. We drop
the year of program inception due to its ambiguous treatment status. In all the graphs, the regression
includes town and year fixed effects. We report the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval. The last
election/year before the program (“-1”) is the omitted category. The coefficient on ghost building intensity
for this group is normalized to zero. Confidence interval width for this election is obtained as the mean of
the confidence interval width in election/year -2 and election/year +1.
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Figure A.5: Robustness to changes in election sample time span
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Notes: The figure presents robustness of the results on incumbent reelection to changes in sample years.
The y-axis shows the coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals) on the interaction between ghost building
intensity and the post-program indicator as estimated in our baseline specification (Table 4, Column 7). The
x-axis is the start year of the alternative election samples we use (the final year is 2011 for all the samples).
The first sample, 1993-2011, is the baseline sample. In 1993, an electoral law reform introduced mayor
individual ballot election. The marker label shows the number of observations in each sample.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Variable description and sources
Variable Definition and measure Sample Source
Ghost Building Ghost Building Intensity Program ATD
Intensity Ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings inception
and the total number of parcels.
Registration Rate Registration Rate 2011 ATD
Percentage of ghost building parcels that get registered by the April 2011
Total expenditures Total local expenditures 2000-2011 IMI
Per-resident Financial reports,
Quadro 3
Town Area Size Area Size of the town, 2001 SAIM
in square km
Altitude Altitude 2001 SAIM
Altitude of the city, in meters
Population Population 2001 Census
Population, in thousand of inhabitants
Disposable Income Disposable income per capita at the 2005 SAIM
per capita municipal level, in thousand of euros
Urbanization Index Index is equal to one if density is less than 100 people per sq. km; it is 2001 SAIM
equal to two if density is between 100 and 500 people per sq. km;
it is equal to three if density is above 500 people per sq.km.
Non-Profit Associations Non profit association 2001 SAIM
per thousand of inhabitants
Number of Firms Number of firms per capita 2001 SAIM
per capita thousand of inhabitants
Justify Tax Answers to the question “Do you Justify Tax Cheating?”, originally coded 1981-2008 EVS
Cheating on a scale 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). Normalized variable.
Speed of Public Speed of current expenditures 2005-2006 IMI
Good Provision Ratio between paid over committed current expenditures
Notes: ATD stands for Agenzia del Territorio Database. IMI stands for Italian Ministry of the Interior. SAIM stands for Statistical Atlas of Italian Municipalities.
EVS stands for European Values Survey.
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Table A.2: Political Variables description and sources
Variable Definition and measure Sample Source
Mayor Age Age of the mayor Program IMI
Age of the mayor, in number of years inception
Mayor Education Education of the mayor Program IMI
Categories: Primary Education, High school education, University degree, inception
Postgraduate professional schooling, GED equivalent schooling, Vocational schooling
Mayor Born Same City Place of birth of the mayor Program IMI
Dummy variable equal to 1 if mayor is born in the same city inception
Mayor Term Number Tenure of the mayor Program IMI
Number of the mayoral’s term, in number of years inception
Mayor Woman Gender of the mayor Program IMI
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor is a woman inception
Term Limit Indicator Mayor is not eligible for reelection 1993-2011 IMI
Equal to 1 if mayor has a binding term limit
Incumbent Reelection Incumbent mayor is reelected 1993-2011 IMI
Equal to 1 if mayor is reelected
Incumbent Rerun Incumbent mayor decides to run for office again 1993-2011 IMI
Equal to 1 if mayor re-runs
N. Candidates Number of candidates 1993-2011 IMI
Number of candidates
Victory Margin Margin of victory 1993-2011 IMI
Margin of victory of the incumbent mayor
Runoff Election has a runoff 1993-2011 IMI
Runoff
Notes: IMI stands for Italian Ministry of the Interior.
49
Table A.3: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Region Region and Controls Town w/ Trim top 1% Drop Small Post 2007 Alternative
Interactions Interactions post-election Intensity Towns Instrument Normalization
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.042∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗ 1.255∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗ 0.119∗
(0.378) (0.386) (0.459) (0.368) (0.493) (0.390) (0.563) (0.067)
Observations 25893 25893 25893 17566 25618 23337 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected (mean 0.453). Post is a binary indicator equal to
one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to
one if the election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects and
an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. In the specification Region Interactions, we add interactions between the post-program indicator
and regional fixed effects. In the specification Region and Controls Interactions, we add interactions between the post-program indicator and regional fixed
effects and between the post-program indicator and town-controls (refer to Table 1 for a list of these variables). In the specification Town w/post-election
we only retain in our sample the towns with one post-program election. In the specification Trim top 1% Intensity, we drop towns in the first percentile of
ghost building intensity (0.0928). In the specification Drop Small Towns, we exclude from the sample towns within the bottom 10% of the distribution of land
registry parcels (2633). In Columns (1)-(3) and (5) Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the modal
program inception year in the province. In Column (7) — Post 2007— we instrument it with a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after 2007,
the start date for the first (and modal) round of the program in the country. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number of land
registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. except in Column (8) — Alternative Normalization — where it is defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of buildings. All the regressions include town fixed effects,
election-year fixed effects and an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011
in which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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